การจัดซื้อเรือรบและอาวุธยุทโธปกรณ์ทางเรือของกองทัพเรือไทยภายหลังเหตุการณ์ ร.ศ. 112 พ.ศ. 2437–2453

Abstract

This research article aims to examine the procurement of warships and naval armaments by the Siamese Navy after the R.S. 112 incident in the years 1894 to 1910 using a historical research methodology. The objectives of the study are: 1) To examine the changes in the procurement of warships and naval armaments after the defeat of Siam in the R.S. 112 crisis, and 2) To examine the adaptation of naval ships and weapons to Thailand’s evolving national defense strategies in the aftermath of the crisis.

The results show that Siam's procurement of warships and naval equipment during the reign of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) after the R.S. 112 incident can be divided into two main phases:  1) The initial phase of the regular procurement of warships and the classification of naval vessels (1894–1905): This period marked Siam’s entry into the era of formal procurement of warships, which had not existed before. During the reign of King Mongkut (Rama IV) until the R.S. 112 crisis, command of the navy was divided between the Front Palace faction (Wang Na) and the Bunnag family, resulting in warships being treated more like semi-private vessels of powerful political groups under royal patronage. These ships were primarily used to demonstrate the prestige of the elite and maintain diplomatic relations, rather than being categorized or used as permanent military assets. After the crisis of 1893, however, the ruling elite began to recognize the strategic importance of a modern standing navy. Between 1894 and 1905, the Royal Siamese Navy procured modern cruisers and gunboats as well as rapid-fire artillery and sea mines to improve river and coastal defense. 2) The expansion phase for the defense of the Gulf of Thailand (1905–1910): During this phase, the Siamese Navy endeavored to acquire torpedo boats that were not yet part of the fleet. For the first time in Thai history, a formal defense strategy for the navy was developed, moving from a static fortress-based defense at the mouth of the Chao Phraya River to a dynamic ship-based defense line. This new strategy extended the line of defense to key maritime choke points and established outposts along the islands and coastal areas stretching from Khao Sam Roi Yot to Ko Chuang, with Ko Si Chang becoming a key strategic naval base.