An Analysis of the Argument That "What Is Empty Cannot Be Used to Prove Anything"

Abstract

One of the central elements of Madhyamaka philosophy is the concept of śūnyatā (emptiness), profoundly articulated by Nāgārjuna in his texts Vigrahavyāvartanī and Śūnyatāsaptati. This concept posits that all phenomena lack inherent existence (svabhāva) and arise solely through dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). This article explores Nāgārjuna’s critique of svabhāva, particularly his logical refutations of the view that things possess intrinsic nature. While proponents of inherent existence argue that if all things are empty, then even the Madhyamaka’s own discourse must lack truth-value and therefore cannot prove śūnyatā, Nāgārjuna counters this in Vigrahavyāvartanī verse 22. He argues that language and conceptual thought, although devoid of intrinsic being, still function through dependent conditions—just as a pot, though empty of inherent nature, can still hold water. This dependent functionality does not negate meaning but redefines it within a relational framework.Through careful logical analysis, particularly regarding causality, Nāgārjuna shows that the assumption of inherent existence fails to explain how causes produce effects. Madhyamaka thus proposes emptiness not as a negation of reality but as a lens through which the interdependent, non-substantial nature of all things becomes intelligible. This article argues that śūnyatā is not synonymous with non-being; rather, it allows for the recognition of ultimate reality through the profound interconnectedness of phenomena.