The Role of Members of Parliament in Constituency Engagement and the Legal Constraints Under Section 144 of the 2017 Constitution of Thailand

Abstract

This research article examines (1) the development of the provisions of Section 144 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand; analyzes (2) the power structure in the government budget allocation under Section 144; and studies (3) the impacts of Section 144 on the role of the legislative branch as the representatives of the people. The qualitative research approach was employed using the technique of doctrinal research together with an analysis of Constitutional Court decisions and comparative legal studies. Findings show that Section 144 functions as a mechanism for the constitutional regulation of fiscal politics, combining both structural constraints and behavioral controls. This provision continues to adhere to the principle of executive initiative in budgeting while restricting the role of the legislative branch to a form of negative power. Nevertheless, a major issue lies in the broadly framed prohibitions, particularly the phrase “directly or indirectly involved,” together with the severe constitutional sanctions imposed. The Constitutional Court’s substantive approach to interpretation has further expanded the scope of behavioral control over the representatives at a high level. This may create a “legislative chilling effect” on the performance of legislative duties. The researcher has the following recommendations. The provisions of Section 144 should be amended to create a balance between controlling policy corruption and protecting the role of the representatives within the democratic system. The scope of the prohibitions should be clarified. Sanctions should be adjusted to be consistent with the principle of proportionality. Procedural safeguards should be strengthened. To improve Thailand’s system of constitutional regulation of fiscal politics in a balanced and sustainable manner.